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LITIGATION AGAINST FRACKING BANS AND MORATORIUMS IN THE US: 
EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 
 
A number of US states, counties and municipalities have responded to the public health and 
environmental concerns surrounding fracking by imposing bans or moratoriums on 
unconventional oil and gas drilling. These restrictions have, in recent years, given rise to 
litigation challenges by oil and gas companies and by property owners deprived of potential 
revenues. The current article begins by examining precisely who has litigated. Have large 
companies dominated or is it mostly smaller independents? Is there a difference in litigation 
rates between private and public companies? The article then considers how Hirschman’s 
ideas of exit, voice and loyalty might apply in the context of bans and moratoriums and 
further explores some of the factors that may have driven litigation in the area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
High volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) or fracking involves the injection of large 
quantities of water under pressure along with proppants such as sand, and other chemicals.1 It 
is used, together with horizontal drilling techniques, to extract “unconventional” oil and gas 
from shale rock or tight sands. The US has, in the past decade, undergone a “shale 
revolution”, with a significant industry having developed across the country, producing 
enough oil and gas to take it closer to self-sufficiency2 and with much reduced energy prices. 
While industry has extolled the benefits of shale, fracking has also produced its fair share of 
controversy. Lax regulatory controls3 have fed concerns over, inter alia, water and soil 
contamination by fracking chemicals or methane, depletion of water resources, local air 
pollution from wellbores, compressor stations and site traffic, and climate change impacts 
from uncaptured methane. The Gasland documentary, which famously showed flames 
coming out of kitchen taps, is regarded by many detractors as emblematic of the problems 
associated with the shale boom. It is these public concerns that have led to a sizeable number 
of local communities imposing bans or moratoriums on fracking in their areas.4 
 
Fracking has also given rise to significant private law litigation by home owners and others 
who claim to have suffered loss as a result of the industry’s operations.5 Such claims – across 
                                                          
1 See further U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 
(2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/ prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf.   
2 U.S. Energy Imports and Exports to come into Balance for First Time since 1950s, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Apr. 15, 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20812. 
3 See, e.g., exemption from the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j (26) (2012). The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 largely excluded hydraulic fracturing from the former Act’s underground injection control 
program (42 U.S.C. § 300h). For this and other examples, see further, Katherine Toan, Not Under My Backyard: 
The Battle Between Colorado and Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 26 COLO. NAT. 
RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2015) at 13-17. 
4 For a list of state bans and moratoriums, see http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/. 
5 See, e.g., Kaoru Suzuki, The Role of Nuisance in the Developing Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 265 (2014); Michael Goldman, A Survey of Typical Claims and Key Defenses 
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a range of torts including trespass and nuisance – have covered a number of different types of 
alleged harm, from drinking water contamination to human health impacts of air pollution. 
However such litigation is not the focus of the current article. What it analyses instead is the 
litigation brought by the economic actors on the other side of the debate, who seek to benefit 
from shale and other forms of unconventional oil and gas drilling. In particular, it examines 
court challenges brought by the oil and gas industry and property owners against bans and 
moratoriums on unconventional oil and gas operations introduced by US local government. 
  
The article examines who has been bringing litigation against fracking bans and moratoriums 
introduced by US states, municipalities and counties. Where the economic actors involved are 
oil and gas companies, it aims to identify what type of company they are. Are they large 
multi-national “majors”, with integrated operations from upstream (exploration and 
production, including drilling), through midstream (transportation, e.g. via pipelines), to 
downstream (refining, gas processing, and the sale of hydrocarbon end products)? Are they 
large, non-integrated “independents” (focusing principally on upstream activity) with a 
national scale? Or are they predominantly smaller independents operating out of single states 
or regional oil and gas fields? Besides firm size and level of vertical integration, is the model 
of ownership significant? In other words, is there a difference between privately owned 
companies and those whose stock is publicly listed on a national stock exchange? 
 
As will be seen, the data reveals a particular puzzle, which is that among oil and gas company 
litigants, the majority of cases have been brought by smaller companies. This is puzzling 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Asserted in Recent Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 305 (2013); Hilary M. Goldberg, 
Melanie Stallings Williams, and Deborah Cours, It's A Nuisance: The Future of Fracking Litigation in The 
Wake of Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2015). 
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because one might expect large companies, with greater access to resources, to be better 
placed to take on expensive litigation. I argue that rational choice theory can help to explain 
this puzzle, and may also assist in understanding some of the broader recent trends in 
fracking ban litigation. 
  
Having explored the data on who is litigating, the article then investigates the extent to which 
Albert Hirschman’s typology of exit, voice and loyalty provides a useful lens on responses by 
economic actors to US fracking bans and moratoriums.6 Litigation in this context represents 
one form of “voice” alongside political campaigning and lobbying; “exit” to another 
municipality, county or state without a ban or moratorium may also be an option for some 
economic actors; and the article additionally explores whether any decision to exercise voice 
through litigation rather than to exit may be influenced by loyalty to the relevant geographical 
area. 
 
I. FRACKING BANS AND MORATORIUMS 
With growing concern on the part of many local communities over the potential health and 
environmental risks posed by fracking, the US has seen numerous municipalities or counties 
introduce bans or more time-limited moratoriums on the practice.7 A limited number of states 
such as New York and Vermont have also banned fracking. The precise legal form which 
these restrictions take varies.8 In some states, communities have opted for zoning (land use) 
                                                          
6 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For an application of Hirschman’s (separate) work on rhetoric to 
fracking, see Ole Pedersen, The Rhetoric of Environmental Reasoning and Responses as Applied to Fracking, 
27 J. ENVTL. L. 325 (2015). 
7 Supra note 4. 
8 See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in The Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927 (2015) 
at 958-959. 
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measures;9 in others they have employed direct regulatory controls;10 in yet others, bans have 
been implemented via community rights charters.11 
 
Because states also regulate the oil and gas industry, where lower levels of government have 
introduced such moratoriums and bans, one is faced with classic issues of subsidiarity, 
competence and preemption within a federal system. Which level of government is best 
placed to regulate fracking? Is competence exclusive to a particular level, or shared across 
levels? Should local democratic choices on regulation of fracking be allowed to trump state 
democratic preferences, or, on the contrary, is local control preempted by state law, either 
partially or completely? The anti-fracking movement points to the right of communities to be 
able to protect their own health and the local environment. Industry, in contrast, argues that 
only state-level control can produce the legal certainty needed for investment and prevent an 
inefficient patchwork of different rules emerging.12 Inevitably, this conflict of views has 
ended up in court, with industry most often challenging local restrictions on preemption 
grounds, 13 discussed further below (along with other types of challenge). 
 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dalllas, No. DC-14-01443 (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014). 
10 See, e.g., Citadel Exploration v. San Benito County, No. 15-00028 (Calif. Super.Ct., San Benito Cty. filed 
March 3, 2015). 
11 See, e.g., Bass Energy Inc v. City of Broadview Heights, No. CV-14-828074 (Cuy. Ct. C.P March 10, 2015). 
For more detail on the Charter, see Mothers Against Drilling in Our Neighborhoods v. Ohio, No. CV-14-836899 
(Cuy. Ct. C.P. Dec. 4, 2014). 
12 Toan, supra note 3. 
13 See further Gregory R. Nearpass and Robert J. Brenner, High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing and Home Rule: 
The Struggle for Control, 76 ALB. L. REV. 167 (2013); David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local 
Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351 (2014); Toan, supra note 3; Jamal Knight and Bethany Gullman, The Power of 
State Interest: Preemption of Local Fracking Ordinances in Home-Rule Cities, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 297 
(2015). 
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The US is not the only country to have seen bans and moratoriums on fracking. There are 
numerous instances worldwide, including for example national bans in France and Bulgaria, 
national moratoriums in Germany and Scotland and regional bans in countries such as Spain 
and Canada. And some of these countries have, similarly, seen industry litigation challenging 
such restrictions. Thus in France for example, Schuepbach Energy14 (unsuccessfully) 
challenged the 2011 national law preventing hydraulic fracking.15 However, the US is unique 
in having developed such a significant body of case law in a relatively short period, which 
makes it particularly worthy of study. 
 
II. HIRSCHMAN’S EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 
Hirschman’s trilogy of exit, voice and loyalty was developed primarily as a means of 
explaining how the forces of competition work to discipline firms and to prevent them from 
allowing the quality of their offering to deteriorate. While focused on companies, Hirschman 
emphasises that the concepts are also applicable to membership organisations such as trade 
unions or political parties. For both companies and such organisations he describes exit and 
voice as “mechanisms of recuperation”16 from reduced quality. 
 
When confronted by poor quality or service in a competitive market, a consumer typically 
has a choice between exiting to another company, purchasing its product or service instead, 
or exercising voice within the existing company. Hirschman describes the latter as follows: 
                                                          
14 A private, US headquartered independent oil and gas company with operations globally. 
15 See the Conseil Constitutionnel, Schuepbach Energy LLC, No. 2013-346 QPC October 11, 2013 (upholding 
as constitutional arts 1 and 3 of Law no. 2011-835 of July 13, 2011 on the prevention of the exploration and 
exploitation of liquid or gas hydrocarbon mines by hydraulic fracking and revoking exclusive licences to 
prospect for projects that use this technique). 
16 Hirschman, supra note 6, at 5. 
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To resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the customer or member to make an attempt 
at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or the 
organization to which one belongs. Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to 
change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs.17 
However, in a monopoly situation, the exit option is likely to be unavailable, meaning that 
only voice is available to dissatisfied customers or members.18 
 
Loyalty to a firm or organisation is described as “a key concept in the battle between exit and 
voice”.19 It not only increases the costs of exit,20 thus making exit less likely, but also 
increases the likelihood of voice because people have an attachment and are therefore more 
likely to try to achieve change from within.21 Graham and Keeley identify loyalty as the least 
understood of Hirschman’s variables.22 They note that while some see it as a third 
behavioural response after exit and voice, others regard it as an affective state and therefore 
as an intermediate variable that influences the choice between exit and voice. They also point 
out that while some argue that loyalty increases voice, others claim that silent, passive loyalty 
is also a real possibility. 
 
Hirschman’s schema has been employed in relation to both litigation and local government 
decision-making. Thus, with the former, Coffee has argued that enhancing the potential for 
                                                          
17 Id. at30. 
18 Id. at 33. 
19 Id. at 82. 
20 Id. at 80. 
21 Id. at 77. 
22 Jill W Graham and Michael Keeley, Hirschman's Loyalty Construct, 5 EMPLOY. RESPBTIES. & RTS. J. 
191 (1992). 
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“exit” is the best way of improving accountability to clients in class action suits.23 Literature 
on the latter takes inspiration not only from Hirschman but also from Tiebout’s influential 
views on competitive federalism, where the possibility of citizen exit supposedly ensures that 
local governments remain mindful of the need to meet citizen preferences.24 Rose argues that 
accountability for land use decisions by local government is ensured by paying attention to 
voice (via participation) and exit (through predictability).25 Been26 claims that, in deciding on 
the degree of judicial scrutiny of local government exactions,27 account should be taken of 
the ability of developers to exit. Epstein similarly analyses Hirschman’s ideas in relation to 
land use planning,28 but also looks at local government decision-making more generally.29 
 
However, while Hirschman has been examined in the broad context of local government, his 
work has not been employed in the context of fracking. In addition, the above literature is 
broadly normative in orientation, employing Hirschman’s typology as a means of assessing 
the accountability of agents to principals, who may be held in check by combinations of voice 
and exit. In contrast, the current article looks to Hirschman’s ideas of exit, voice and loyalty 
more as a way of understanding different strategic choices that are available to economic 
actors in relation to fracking bans and moratoriums. Litigation as a form of voice is obviously 
one strategic option that has been chosen in a number of instances. Exit offers an alternative 
strategy to litigation, providing economic actors frustrated by bans and moratoriums with the 
ability, in some instances, to move to a different area. And loyalty, bearing in mind 
                                                          
23 John C Coffee, Jr, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000). 
24 Charles M Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J .OF POL. ECON’Y. 416 (1956). 
25 Carol M Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. 
L. REV. 837 (1983). 
26 Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991). 
27 Financial community payments by developers in return for development permission. 
28 Arguing, inter alia, that Been overstates the value of the exit remedy. 
29 Richard A Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992). 
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discussion of the concept above, is regarded, for the purposes of the present article, as an 
affective state that may condition the choice between voice and exit rather than a third 
behavioural response or outcome in addition to those two. Following Hirschman, one might 
assume that loyalty is more likely to raise the costs of exit and lead to increased voice. 
 
III. WHAT FORM IS THE LITIGATION INVOLVING BANS AND MORATORIUMS 
TAKING? 
There are three key potential types of legal challenge to municipal and county level 
moratoriums and bans. The first – and the only type to have produced a significant number of 
judgments so far – are preemption claims, arguing that such municipal regulation is unlawful 
because preempted by state law.30 Such claims typically seek declaratory and/or injunctive 
relief to have the restrictions lifted. The second are “takings” claims, which argue that 
moratoriums or bans are unconstitutional regulatory takings which violate the owners’ 
property rights under, in particular, the Fifth Amendment (or state equivalents).31 The remedy 
sought here is damages to reflect the loss caused by the restriction. Restrictions on fracking 
may now face both types of claim simultaneously, it being considered that adding in a 
damages element produces a more powerful challenge: 
The WSPA [Western States Petroleum Association] raised both arguments in its suit 
against Compton. Observers have noted that a takings claim brings the added 
dimension of a potentially significant verdict against the counties. Many argue that 
                                                          
30 See e.g. Wallach v. Town of Dryden 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014); Lenape Resources v. Town of Avon, No. 
14-00102 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 3, 2014); Anschutz Exploration Corp v. Town of Dryden 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Colorado Oil and Gas Association v. City of Lafayette, No. 13CV31746 (August 27, 
2014). 
31 See, e.g., SWEPI, LP v. Mora County, No. CIV 14-0035 JB/SCY (D.N.M. Jan 19, 2015) (also a preemption 
challenge); Western States Petroleum Association v. City of Compton, No. BC552272 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. 
Cnty. filed July 21, 2014) (also preemption); Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dalllas, supra note 9. 
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localities may rescind their fracking bans rather than risk incurring a large financial 
obligation.32 
Without going into detail on the substantive law on takings,33 the issue with such claims is 
likely to be the difficulty of establishing that all of the economic value of the property has 
been removed. Economic use of the surface land in the form of, say, farming, is likely to still 
be possible;34 and even if the courts view a minerals estate in isolation, then a ban on fracking 
will typically not prevent the employment of conventional well drilling.35 
 
Third, there have also been electoral law challenges surrounding municipal ballots 
introducing bans or moratoriums. For example, Thomas E Cave and Broomfield Balanced 
Energy Coalition v. The City and County of Broomfield36 saw a challenge to the electoral 
process introducing the Broomfield fracking ban. In the event, the court ruled that the city 
had substantially complied with state election laws and that the election should not be set 
aside. 
 
                                                          
32 Barclay Nicholson and Johnjerica Hodge, Fracking Bans May Thrust California Localities Into Contentious 
Legal Battle, Nov. 13, 2014, available at  http://www.hydraulicfrackingblog.com/2014/11/fracking-bans-may-
thrust-california-localities-into-contentious-legal-battle/. 
33 See further, Patrick C McGinley, Regulatory Takings in the Shale Gas Patch, 19 PA. ST. ENVT’L. L. REV. 
193 (2011). 
34 Id., at 217-218. 
35 Albeit that the leaseholder is likely to argue that alternative drilling operations not involving fracking will be 
uneconomic. See further Glenn Coin, With Fracking Banned in New York, What Happens to Landowners, 
Leases?, Dec.  17, 2014, available at 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2014/12/fracking_banned_in_new_york_what_happens_to_landowner
s_leases.html. Even if there is a ban on all oil and gas drilling (and not just fracking), private property rights lost 
under such a ban must be balanced against savings from potential common law nuisance liability, meaning that 
a ban may not be held a taking (McGinley, supra note 33, at 222-234).  
36 No. 13CV30313 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2014). See also, e.g., Grafe-Kieklak v. Town of Sidney, No. 213-
602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Del. Cty. Jan. 9, 2014); Beezley and Broomfield Balanced Energy Coalition v. The City and 
County of Broomfield, No. 2013CV30304 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2014). 
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While most preemption challenges have been examples of what Harlow and Rawlings call 
“proactive” litigation,37 brought by economic actors as plaintiffs, there have also been 
examples of “reactive” litigation,38 where a company goes ahead with drilling and waits to be 
sued as a defendant for breaching local ordinances. Thus in State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck 
Energy Corp.,39 Beck had been granted a state permit to drill (in fact a conventional well 
here) and had just started drilling operations. The city of Monroe Falls then took the company 
to court claiming that it was unlawfully drilling in breach of local regulations. The Ohio 
Supreme Court ruled against Monroe Falls, holding that local licensing controls were 
preempted by state regulation of oil and gas drilling. 
 
Another form of reactive litigation surrounding bans and moratoriums has involved lease 
contract renewals or extensions.40 Most of the relevant minerals lease contracts contain a 
clause leading to expiry of the lease if drilling by the minerals lessee (and hence associated 
royalty payments to the landowner) has not taken place during a specified period. In New 
York, a number of oil and gas companies, fearing that the state’s moratorium would lead to 
termination through inactivity in this way, argued that the moratorium amounted to “force 
majeure”— an unpredictable situation beyond the company’s control which prevented it from 
drilling. Such a situation meant that the delay imposed by the moratorium should not count 
for the purposes of the lease.41 A number of landowners litigated in order to enforce their 
termination rights under the contracts and these challenges were typically defended by oil and 
                                                          
37 CAROL HARLOW AND RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW (1992). 
38 Id. 
39 143 Ohio St.3d 271, 2015-Ohio-485. 
40 See, e.g., Walter R. Beardslee, et al. v. Inflection Energy LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2015);  
Beardslee v. Inflection Energy LLC, No. 12-4897 (2d Cir. 2015).   
41 Id.; see also, Anya Litvak, Uncommon Legal Concept May Surface in New York after Fracking Ban, PITT. 
POST-GAZ., Dec. 23, 2014, available at http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-
powersource/2014/12/23/Uncommon-legal-concept-may-surface-in-New-York-after-fracking-
ban/stories/201412230015. 
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gas companies trying to ensure that they did not lose the remaining economic value of the 
leases they had purchased. However, the current article is principally concerned with an 
analysis of proactive challenges against bans and moratoriums, and thus reactive cases like 
these and the Beck one in the previous paragraph will not be further considered. 
 
Economic actors have also become involved in litigation against fracking bans or 
moratoriums via amicus curiae briefs. In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth42 for 
example, an anticipatory challenge was brought by municipalities to a new state level law on 
oil and gas (Act 13) that would effectively prevent municipal home rule of fracking. Local oil 
and gas associations (Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association, the Marcellus 
Shale Coalition) and a range of companies43 were allowed to participate as amicus curiae in 
oral argument in support of the state. In a mixed ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that elements of the restrictive state law were unconstitutional, while also underlining that 
municipalities could not ban fracking entirely. Again, although a preemption related 
challenge, not being litigation directly brought by an economic actor, it is not included in the 
main data here. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The current article is a small number (n = 23 legal cases) case study. Out of what has become 
a vast range of fracking litigation, the focus – as already adverted to in the previous section – 
is on suits brought by economic actors against fracking bans and moratoriums introduced by 
                                                          
42 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
43 MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Resources LLC, Penneco Oil Company Inc, and Chesapeake Appalachia 
LLC. 
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townships, municipalities and states. I include cases which involve what have been asserted 
to be de facto bans,44 but I have not covered fracking-related cases where local government 
simply denies, for example, zoning permission to an individual applicant without this being 
part of a wider ban or moratorium.45 While the main focus is on fracking bans and 
moratoriums, I have included cases challenging bans or moratoriums on wider oil and gas 
drilling because these will invariably also rule out fracking. Litigants in such cases may have 
been intending to employ HVHF; equally, however, there are some who said they intended to 
drill only conventional wells.46 Both have been included. To count as a suit, a case had to 
have been filed in court. I did not, therefore, count cases where a pre-action notice of claim 
had been served on the relevant local government but no case had actually been filed.47 The 
above focus means that the study is longitudinally self-limiting: such challenges have only 
occurred within the last five years and most of them are much more recent than that.  
 
The cases involving litigation were identified by searching existing fracking litigation 
databases drawn up by some of the key law firms acting in the area,48 which catalogue 
fracking cases by type, and then by searching the emerging academic literature on the case 
law challenging bans and moratoriums.49 While this builds a fairly complete picture, what it 
may not always capture are proceedings that have been filed by companies but where the 
relevant municipality has decided to lift the ban rather than face the significant expense of 
                                                          
44 E.g. Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dalllas, supra note 9. 
45 E.g. Markwest Liberty Midstream & Res., L.L.C. v. Cecil Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 102 A.3d 549, 573 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2014). 
46 See, e.g., Jennifer Huntingdon, the farmer landowner plaintiff in Cooperstown Holstein Corp.  v. Town of 
Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
47 E.g. Highland Field & Stream Club, Inc v. The Town of Highland (filed Oct. 5, 2012).  
48 Barclay Nicholson, Norton Rose Fulbright, Analysis of Litigation Involving Shale and Hydraulic Fracturing, 
June 1, 2014, available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20140101-analysis-of-litigation-involving-
shale-hydraulic-fracturing-104256.pdf; Arnold & Porter, Hydraulic Fracturing Case Chart, Dec. 2, 2015, 
available at  
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Case%20Chart.pdf. 
49 E.g. Nearpass and Brenner, supra n 13; Spence, supra n 13. 
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defending the action.50 I therefore followed this up by using internet searches to locate bans 
and moratoriums and searching for any litigation against the relevant municipalities or states 
which had introduced them. This would also be expected to pick up very recent cases which 
the databases may not yet have included. Finally, I used interviews with industry actors to 
triangulate my list of cases, checking that there were no other examples of which the 
interviewees were aware. The cut-off period for the purposes of the research was the end of 
March 2015. 
 
V. WHO IS LITIGATING AGAINST BANS AND MORATORIUMS? 
Before examining the data below, it is worth pointing out that many of the 23 cases involved 
more than one plaintiff. For data purposes, if a case involved for example three landowner 
plaintiffs, these were counted in Table 1 below as three plaintiffs rather than as a single 
example of a landowner case; similarly, if a case involved one landowner, one oil and gas 
company and one trade association, it was counted against all three of these plaintiff types. 
 
Looking at the data to see who is litigating against bans and moratoriums, it is apparent that it 
is a mix of oil and gas companies, state oil and gas trade associations, property owners, state 
agencies and private citizens and citizen groups.  
 
 
                                                          
50 On this issue of capitulation see, e.g., Terry Smith, Court Rulings Suggest Athens Fracking Ban is 
Indefensible, THE ATHENS NEWS, March 18, 2015,available at  
http://www.athensnews.com/opinion/wearing_thin/court-rulings-suggest-athens-fracking-ban-is-
indefensible/article_9a4b90e4-ec43-5648-8569-2569d1bb22d3.html. 
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Table 1: Types of plaintiff  
Type of 
Plaintiff 
State 
agency 
Private 
citizens/groups 
O& G 
Trade 
Association 
O&G 
Companies 
Landowner 
Number of 
Suits 
2 4 6 14 12 
 
Given the relatively small overall number of cases involved, one should beware of reading 
too much into the data. However, bearing that in mind, by far the greater proportion of claims 
has been taken by economic interests and, within these, in particular by oil and gas 
companies, albeit closely followed by landowners. 
 
Table 2: Type of Oil & Gas Company Plaintiff (n=14 for each of small/large, public/private, 
local/national) 
Type of 
Plaintiff 
Small 
Companies 
Large 
companies 
Publicly 
listed 
Privately 
owned 
Local National/multi-
national 
Number 
of Suits 
10 4 5 9 9 5 
 
If one further unpacks the data on suits brought by oil and gas companies, set out in Table 2, 
then it can be seen that the majority have been initiated by smaller companies, most of which 
are local (state or regional). Larger companies have been involved as plaintiffs in only four 
suits. Of these large companies, one was a subsidiary of a supermajor (Shell), one was 
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integrated, one was an independent and one was a mid-stream pipeline infrastructure 
company. 
 
Just as the difference between small and large companies is noticeable, with many more suits 
brought by the former than the latter, there is also a sharp distinction when one looks at the 
corporate ownership model. Five suits have been brought by publicly listed companies owned 
by shareholders, but nearly twice that number have been instigated by privately owned 
companies. 
 
VI. EXIT 
In discussing exit from an area with a ban or moratorium, it is important to distinguish 
between oil and gas companies and property owners because their potential exit dynamics are 
different. Beginning with oil and gas companies, in New York, many – particularly small and 
medium sized ones – do appear to have exited their unconventional New York State acreage 
without litigating: 
Mr. Gill contends that the drawn-out nature of state deliberations on whether to allow 
fracking — the process has been under way for four years — has allowed many land 
leases to expire and prompted some companies to walk away and focus their 
resources on drilling in other states. Companies like Talisman Energy and Inflection 
Energy, which have drilled with conventional methods in New York and had hoped to 
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expand into hydraulic fracturing, have moved operations to Pennsylvania, Mr. Gill 
said.51 
In contrast, subsidiaries of supermajors such as ExxonMobil’s XTO Energy and Shell’s 
SWEPI52 appear to have maintained their unconventional New York acreage rather than 
exited by selling leases or letting them expire.53 Very large companies like these can afford to 
let their unconventional assets sit idle, playing the long game in a way that smaller and 
medium sized firms cannot. That said, Shell has in recent years sold a significant proportion 
of its US shale acreage,54 apparently preferring to focus on more profitable LNG and offshore 
assets instead.55 In its case it may simply be that any New York assets it holds are now 
virtually worthless in any event which means that no New York acreage sales have been 
apparent. 
                                                          
51 Mireya Navarro, Bans and Rules Muddy Prospects for Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/nyregion/bans-and-new-rules-make-gas-drillings-future-uncertain-in-new-
york.html?_r=1. In Talisman’s case, despite having considerable unconventional acreage in New York, it was it 
seems a conscious decision not to litigate (see Litvak, supra note 41 at 34). See also Daniel Wiessner, NY 
Unlikely to Face Lawsuits Over Fracking Ban, Experts Say, REUTERS, Dec. 18, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/18/us-energy-fracking-newyork-lawsuits-idUSKBN0JW04D20141218: 
“Thomas West, an Albany attorney who represents some of the companies that have left New York, said his 
clients had taken their investments to the more than 30 states that allow fracking”. 
52 Shell bought a range of Appalachian acreage, including in New York, from East Resources in 2010 for $4.7 
billion (Andrew Maykuth, Shell Pays $4.7B for Marcellus Firm, PHIL. INQUIR., May 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/marcellus-
shale/20100529_Shell_pays__4_7B_for_Marcellus_firm.html). 
53 Interview with Karen Moreau, Executive Director NY, American Petroleum Institute (API). In Dec. 2015, 
Shell’s website stated that the company maintained acreage in New York: http://www.shell.us/about-us/projects-
and-locations/appalachia-pennsylvania.htm. In September 2014, XTO stated that it held 43,000 acres in its 
southern tier counties of New York (Randy J Cleveland, Policy, Responsibility and People: Leading the Way on 
Shale, presented at Shale Insight, Marcellus Shale Coalition Pittsburgh, PA., Sept. 24, 2014, available at  
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-and-updates/speeches/policy-responsibility-and-people-
leading-the-way-on-shale). 
54 Much of the Appalachian acreage it bought from East Resources was sold in 2014 to Rex Energy (at a very 
significant loss). Also in 2014, it sold its Pinedale gas acreage in Wyoming to Ultra Petroleum and its interest in 
Haynesville Shale in Louisiana to Vine Oil and Gas. However, in its deal with Ultra Petroleum it also acquired 
some acreage in Pennsylvania (see Anya Litvak, Shell Concentrating its Marcellus Holdings, Sells Off Other 
Shale Assets, PITT. POST-GAZ., Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/powersource/companies/2014/08/14/Shell-concentrating-its-Marcellus-holdings-sells-off-other-
shale-assets/stories/201408140284). It has also since ‘accidentally’ acquired some Appalachian and other shale 
assets through its takeover of BG Group, bought primarily for its assets such as LNG and offshore Brazil (see 
Joe Fisher, Shales Barely Mentioned in Shell-BG Group Deal Talk, NAT. GAS INTELL., Apr. 8, 2015, 
available at http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/101915-shales-barely-mentioned-in-shell-bg-group-deal-
talk). 
55 A strategic direction cemented by its takeover of BG Group. 
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It is worth noting that Hirschman never regarded voice and exit as mutually exclusive and 
that is borne out here. There are cases such as Anschutz,56 Lenape,57 National Fuel,58 and 
Norse Energy59 where unsuccessful litigation has led to subsequent exit from the restrictive 
area. In Norse’s case, that exit from New York State was effectively a forced exit via 
bankruptcy.60 
 
It is also worth observing that exit in terms of unconventional oil and gas because of blocked 
opportunities does not necessarily mean an exit by the business from the area altogether. 
Thus for example in New York State, although as noted in the quote above, Talisman exited 
New York to take up unconventional opportunities elsewhere, it remains active in the state 
for the purposes of its existing conventional61 operations in the Trenton/Black River area,62 
where it has around 80 wells (though with no new developments). And similarly with Lenape 
mentioned above, while it exited the town of Avon in New York State as far as 
unconventional operations were concerned, it continued with its longstanding conventional 
                                                          
56 “Anschutz is ‘in the process of selling assets, surrendering leased lands and exiting New York,’ Brent 
Temmer, a spokesman for the closely-held company, said in an e-mail” (Chris Dolmetsch et al., Anti-Fracking 
Win in N.Y. Court May Deal Blow to Industry, BLOOMB’G. BUS., June 30, 2014, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-30/n-y-cities-win-right-to-ban-fracking-oil-industry-loss);see 
also Denver Business Journal, Anschutz Ending Drilling Efforts in New York, Dec. 3 2012, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/morning_call/2012/12/anschutz-ending-drilling-efforts-in.html. 
57 Interview with John Holko, President and owner, Lenape Resources. 
58 Litvak, supra note 41. 
59 Glenn Coin, Norse Energy Shutting Down U.S. Operations as New York Hydrofracking Moratorium 
Continues, Oct. 17, 2013, 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/10/norse_energy_were_leaving_new_york_because_we_cant_fra
ck.html. 
60 Id. 
61 Some of this has involved horizontal drilling, but not fracking (Marcellus Drilling News, Details on Trenton-
Black River Horizontal Drilling in NY State, Nov. 21, 2014, available at  
http://marcellusdrilling.com/2014/11/details-on-trenton-black-river-horizontal-drilling-in-ny-state/). 
62 Litvak, supra note 41. 
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wells in the area.63 Production from conventional wells operated by such companies of course 
means that their leases remain active for the purposes of possible future unconventional 
drilling, should the New York ban be lifted in the future. 
 
Depending on their ownership category, property owners are likely to be in a somewhat 
different position in relation to exit. Many property owners – particularly those in areas with 
only a recent history of resource exploitation64 – will own both the surface land and the 
minerals estate associated with it. If they then lease the minerals estate to an oil and gas 
company for drilling, then, assuming the well is commercial, they will also own the royalty 
interest which entitles them, under the terms of the lease to royalty payments from the 
operator on production. These payments can range from several thousand to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars or more per year based on the size of the acreage, oil prices, and the 
negotiation skills of the landowner or their agent.65 Depending on the relevant state law, 
surface rights and mineral rights may be divided, and royalty interests can also be sold 
separately (i.e. a landowner may choose to keep the minerals estate but to sell the royalty 
interests from one or more wells). What happens with exit is likely to turn on the ownership 
category into which a property owner falls. In a more general, non-oil and gas, property 
development context, Epstein states of exit that: 
                                                          
63 Interview with John Holko, Lenape. 
64 Timothy W Kelsey et al., Marcellus Shale: Land Ownership, Local Voice, and the Distribution of Lease and 
Royalty Dollars, CECD Research Paper Series, Pennsylvania State University, July 18, 2012,  available at 
http://aese.psu.edu/research/centers/cecd. 
65 They will also receive a signing on bonus when they sign the lease, the size of which can, again, vary 
considerably from thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
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It may well be that the developer has options to take the project elsewhere … but it 
surely does not follow that the landowner who wishes to sell to the developer has the 
same level of mobility or the same level of choices.66 
In the current oil and gas context, that is also likely to be true of surface property owners who 
own the minerals estate (i.e. where there has been no division): assuming they live on the 
property, they are unlikely to be in the same position to leave the area in the face of a ban as a 
more mobile oil and gas company (the latter being more akin to Epstein’s developer).  
However, where estates have been divided, then the minerals or royalty interest owner may 
well be from outside the area in the first place and thus for them, exiting is more about 
seeking better income-producing opportunities from property elsewhere rather than 
physically changing where they live. Of course this assumes they have the funds available 
and many may not. In principle a surface property owner might choose to do the same, 
staying where they are physically but investing in productive leases or royalties elsewhere; 
however again, not all landowners will have the funds to do so. 
 
VII. VOICE 
Although litigation is the main form of voice examined in the current article, it is worth 
noting that voice may also take the form of campaigning and political lobbying, which has 
been a key initial strategy for a number of companies to try to avoid local bans or 
moratoriums being passed in the first place. Taking just one example, in California it has 
been reported that “A coalition funded by Chevron, ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum and 
other oil giants donated roughly $2.1 million to the opposition campaign in San Benito 
                                                          
66 Epstein, supra note 29 at 155. 
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County, outspending supporters 14-1”.67 However, where such efforts fail and bans or 
moratoriums are introduced by local governments, then one is reasonably likely to see 
litigation adopted as an alternative strategy by some economic actors.  
 
Looking at the data on litigation presented earlier, the greatest puzzle appears to be why it is 
that smaller companies have greatly outweighed larger ones in choosing to litigate. After all, 
from a resources perspective, one might expect litigation to be more the preserve of the 
larger, financially better resourced companies, which are also more likely to have an in-house 
legal team and to be strategic ‘repeat players’ in Galanter’s68 terms.69 For trade associations 
to bring cases is no surprise: they are well resourced and are there to solve what might 
otherwise be a collective action problem posed by which company will take on litigation 
challenging a ban when other companies will clearly benefit from free riding on such a 
challenge. But finding smaller, independent companies taking on a significant amount of the 
relevant litigation does seem somewhat surprising (at least relative to larger companies, since 
even these smaller oil and gas companies are still typically well resourced). 
 
Rational choice theory may, however, provide us with an answer to this puzzle. Given that 
firms are accustomed to thinking in terms of costs and benefits of different courses of action, 
                                                          
67 Paul Rogers, Fracking: Oil company Sues to Overturn San Benito County Fracking Ban; Could Affect Other 
Counties, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS March 3, 2015, available at 
http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci_27626990/fracking-oil-company-sues-overturn-san-benito-county. For 
New York examples, see BRIAN PAUL AND SUSAN LERNER, COMMON CAUSE, DEEP DRILLING, 
DEEP POCKETS IN NEW YORK STATE CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND LOBBYING 
EXPENDITURES BY FRACKING INTERESTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY (2014), available at 
http://www.commoncause.org/states/new-york/research-and-
reports/NY_011314_Deep_Drilling_Deep_Pockets.pdf. 
68 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC REV 95 (1974). 
69 Isaac Unah, Explaining Corporate Litigation Activity in an Integrated Framework of Interest Mobilization, 5 
BUSINESS AND POLITICS 65 (2003). 
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one might expect rational choice to be well suited to explaining decision-making in this 
context. The decision to litigate involves balancing the financial cost of taking a case to court 
against the probability of winning it and the size of the financial benefit to the plaintiff of 
overturning a fracking moratorium or ban.70 A standard rational choice or law and economics 
assumption is therefore that a person will litigate where the expected benefits of doing so are 
greater than the expected trial costs.71 Where this is the case, an economic actor will choose 
to exercise voice via litigating rather than, for example, deciding to exit to make use of 
opportunities in other local government areas without fracking bans or moratoriums. 
 
How then does this enable us to account for the different decisions taken by small and large 
companies when it comes to fracking litigation? After all, in deciding to use litigation as 
voice, both are confronted by an inability to exit without significant financial cost. And on 
one level, the cost/benefit equation they are faced with appears to be similar: while the value 
of leases may be in the many millions, litigation costs are more likely to be measured in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. A number of factors may nevertheless help to explain the 
distinction. It should be pointed out at the outset that it is not simply a matter of smaller 
companies dominating onshore oil and gas exploration involving fracking (in which case one 
would expect them to be proportionately more involved in litigation). The perception has 
arisen that the industry has been centred around so-called ‘mom and pop’ companies. 
However, as Wang and Xue demonstrate, the actual data does not support this: in fact, a 
relatively low number of large companies (mostly large independents with a few integrated 
                                                          
70 FRANCISCO CABRILLO AND SEAN FITZPATRICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COURTS AND 
LITIGATION (2008). 
71 Id.; Holly J McCammon, Labor's Legal Mobilization: Why and when do Workers File Unfair Labor 
Practices?, 28 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 143 (2001); Kathryn E Spier, Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME 1, 259 (A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
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companies) is responsible for by far the majority of shale wells drilled.72 What else might 
explain the greater involvement of small operators in litigation therefore? For small firms, 
their blocked leases are likely to form a greater proportion of their overall assets.  For large 
companies, in contrast, these leases probably represent only a small proportion of their 
operations. This means that larger firms can afford to let those assets drift rather more than 
small firms can, explaining in part why the latter may be more inclined to litigate as a result. 
Next, it is also likely that large companies will be more inclined to worry about reputational 
damage associated with lawsuits than smaller operators and may prefer instead to allow trade 
associations to take on proceedings. To analyse this in rational choice terms, the lost benefits 
caused by a particular ban or moratorium are thus lower for a larger company than they are 
for a smaller one because they are likely to be more marginal in nature for the former type of 
firm. And large companies will also weigh such benefits against the potential reputational 
costs of being seen as a Goliath taking on a small community David.       
 
Rational choice theory can also help to explain changing patterns of litigation. As noted 
above, rational choice argues that the decision to litigate involves balancing the financial cost 
of taking a case to court against the probability of winning it and the size of the financial 
benefit of a win. A key factor in determining the probability of success is the previous 
success of cases. Where preemption victories have been won by others in the past, then that is 
likely to have incentivised further litigation by economic actors because the probability 
element is made greater. In New York State in contrast, a series of demoralising preemption 
                                                          
72 Zhongmin Wang and Xue Qing, The Market Structure of Shale Gas Drilling in the United States  Resources 
for the Future, No. dp-14-31 (2014). 
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defeats for economic actors73 may be one reason why fracking litigation rates in the state 
have dropped off more recently.74 
 
However, others have suggested that resources, or rather a lack of them, are behind the slow-
down of litigation, not just in New York, but also nationally.75 Without intervention to cut 
output by Opec, and with a glut of supply from US shale producers, energy prices tumbled in 
the latter half of 2014 and remained at low levels in 2015. With oil and gas prices at such 
lows and with the industry globally engaging in significant cost cutting as a result, expensive 
preemption litigation designed to free up costly investment in new drilling is now more likely 
to be regarded as an unnecessary luxury. Whether the same can be said of takings claims is 
slightly less clear: some property owners and oil and gas companies might now be tempted 
by the potential of a large damages claim; however, the dual uncertainty of the likely 
doctrinal success of such claims and, even if successful, of the potential for actually 
recovering significant sums from less well-off (and in a number of cases very small) local 
governments will undoubtedly put off many others. 
 
                                                          
73 “As Brad Gill, executive director of the Independent Oil & Gas Association of New York, noted, of the five 
major lawsuits that have challenged the state moratorium or local bans, none have gone in favor of oil and gas 
interests. ‘That was pretty depressing for the industry,’ he said” (Litvak, supra note 41).   
74 Another state-specific reason may be the general decline in oil and gas companies continuing to operate in the 
state, with many, as already noted, having exited. However, property owners typically still remain and litigation 
is perhaps more likely to come from them now. 
75 “According to lawyers following the local control issue, a solid follow-up case to Munroe Falls may simply 
not exist yet. Zoning rules and drilling bans in some other Ohio cities, including Athens, Yellow Springs and 
Mansfield, have not faced industry challenges yet. And the collapse in oil prices means less industry fuel for 
challenges in those locales, which are not considered prime shale territory anyway, said BakerHostetler attorney 
Marty Booher” (Ellen M. Gilmer and Mike Lee, Ohio Towns Play Wait-and-See in Wake of Drilling Ruling, 
March 10, 2015, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS, available at http://midwestenergynews.com/2015/03/10/ohio-
towns-play-wait-and-see-in-wake-of-drilling-ruling/). See also Wiessner (supra note 51): “When Governor 
Andrew Cuomo announced a ban on fracking in New York on Wednesday, he predicted ‘a ton of lawsuits’ 
against the state. But that is unlikely as the end of a drilling boom has left the industry in no mood for a fight, 
industry experts and lawyers said.” 
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From a rational choice perspective, the above in fact involves not only resources – which 
translate into the costs of litigation appearing higher because these will represent a greater 
proportion of overall company expenditure than during boom times – but also decreased 
likely benefits from winning a preemption challenge. With the latter, the benefits to be had 
from drilling wells are much lower in an era of low prices for oil and gas. And as for takings 
claims, there, the size of the benefits pot may be high, but the probability element is low, both 
in terms of doctrinal uncertainty and in terms of the likelihood of actually getting any 
damages award paid in the end. 
 
Ideology also appears to have played a part in some lawsuits, although its precise role is hard 
to gauge. In Vermillion v. Mora County76 for example, the plaintiffs’ case was supported by 
the Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), which describes itself as “a nonprofit, public-
interest legal foundation dedicated to individual liberty, the right to own and use property, 
limited and ethical government, and the free enterprise system.”77 Because of the nature of 
the MSLF’s mission, this case might be seen as an example of ideologically driven litigation, 
with the case’s funding reflecting an ideological desire to uphold constitutional property 
rights. There are also other landowner cases where litigants have explained their decision to 
litigate in terms of seeking to protect their private property rights from municipal diktat. In 
Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield78 for example, the litigant Jennifer 
Huntingdon claimed that “She … wanted to stand up for landowners rights.  Property owners, 
Jennifer explained, secured the land from the center of the earth up to the sky when they 
bought their land and, as she notes, who are five town officials to say what they can and 
                                                          
76 No. 1:13-cv-01095 (New Mex. Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 11, 2013). 
77 https://www.mountainstateslegal.org/.  
78 Supra note 46. 
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cannot do with the resource they rightfully own?”79 Similarly, in Grafe-Kieklak v. Town of 
Sidney,80 one of the litigants, Inge Grafe-Kieklak also underlined the importance of property 
rights in a number of media articles and interviews associated with the case.81 Nevertheless, a 
note of caution is warranted. In the case of litigants who stand to make money from their land 
if fracking is allowed to proceed, it is difficult to separate out a purely ideological view on 
private property rights from the financial rewards to which unimpeded property rights would 
give rise. 
 
VIII. LOYALTY 
While larger multi-national or national-scale companies are unlikely to feel a sense of loyalty 
to a particular state, county or municipality, one might hypothesise that smaller companies 
and surface property owners could be swayed by loyalty to remain and exercise voice rather 
than simply exiting as the first option. As we have seen, the data on who has litigated reveals 
that, among oil and gas companies, by far the greater proportion of lawsuits against bans and 
moratoriums has been instigated by smaller, local firms. Such companies will often have a 
close association with the locality: they will typically have drilling operations solely focused 
on one state and may also have long histories of drilling in particular municipalities. This is 
often mentioned on the ‘about us’ sections of their corporate websites.82 For companies 
whose very identity is tied in with particular geographies, one might suppose that loyalty to 
place would mean that exiting to try opportunities elsewhere is far from ideal, even if it might 
                                                          
79 Rachael Bunzey, A Brave Natural Gas Fight in Middlefield, ENERGY IN DEPTH, Nov. 21, 2012, available 
at http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/a-brave-natural-gas-fight-in-middlefield/ 
80 Supra note 36. 
81 See, e.g., Inge Grafe-Kieklak, Gasland Part II Leaves Landowners Out on the Streets, May 1, 2013, 
http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/gasland-part-2-leaves-landowners-out-on-the-streets/; John Kehoe, As New 
York’s Gas Potential Evaporates, Locals Despair, Jan. 16 2015, 
http://www.brw.com.au/p/national/as_new_york_gas_potential_evaporates_tr9E1Hm3VPSHFimuy4YoFP. 
82 See, e.g., http://citadelexploration.com/four-generations/; and http://bassenergyco.com/. 
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make economic sense on paper; and that this would make them lean more towards litigation. 
However in interview, loyalty did not really register. In the case of one small company 
litigant, there was a degree of loyalty expressed towards those in the community who had 
supported the company in its fight, but no sense in which loyalty had led to a decision to 
litigate rather than to exit. Trade association interviewees expressed similar scepticism 
towards loyalty as a factor in explaining a turn to litigation. 
 
With property owners, matters are more complicated. In the case of litigating property 
owners, most litigants in the case law were surface owners living in the area as well as 
owners of the minerals estate. In some cases, a degree of what might appear to be loyalty to 
place was very much verbalised by these surface owners. In Cooperstown Holstein Corp.  v. 
Town of Middlefield83 for example, the litigant was a farmer, Jennifer Huntingdon, who 
commented on her longstanding connections with the area and her desire to continue with 
these into the future: 
Coming from a long line of dairy farmers, Huntington said she continues the farm’s 
history of concern for family, industry and community while creating a safe food 
product. Responsibility to the environment has been a long-time effort of the farm, 
she said …Many of us have been here for generations and want to pass the land to the 
next generation. We want to preserve our way of life84 
However, loyalty arguably implies the ability to exit, but a decision to remain despite this 
ability. In the case of landowners living in a particular area – and particularly a farmer whose 
family has farmed there for generations – an ability to exit may be there but only really as a 
                                                          
83 Supra note 46. 
84 Marjorie Struckle, A Question of Property Rights, Apr. 14, 2012, http://lancasterfarming.com/results/A-
Question-of-Property-Rights-#.Vm87eEq3PIU. 
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remote possibility. What keeps people from moving house or farm may not be loyalty but 
rather inertia or lack of choice: moving is difficult and the opportunity to do so in terms of 
resources and family circumstances is not available to all. In other words, rather than loyalty, 
one might just as well say that it is inertia or an inability to exit easily that is more likely to 
lead to litigation. 
 
It is therefore tempting to argue, in the case of small local oil and gas companies and resident 
landowners, that it is loyalty to place which makes them apparently more inclined to exercise 
voice via litigation: because they are locally based and because they have litigated rather than 
exited, it would be easy to conclude that this is evidence of a place-based loyalty. However, 
in reality, loyalty here is functioning more as an ex post label than something which helps one 
to explain a turn to litigation.85 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have investigated what Hirschman’s famous exit, voice and loyalty schema 
might contribute to our understanding of the responses of economic actors to bans and 
moratoriums on fracking. One clear contribution is in highlighting the existence of exit as a 
real strategic alternative to litigation for many such actors. In addition, Hirschman’s account 
is often characterised as involving a tension between the market and politics, with exit 
representing the former and voice the latter. However, the current article has shown that 
litigation can also represent a form of voice: politics must therefore be viewed broadly so as 
                                                          
85 This very much chimes with the criticisms of Hirschman’s concept of loyalty offered by authors such as Brian 
Barry and Michael Laver: that it is an outcome and a post hoc equation filler rather than a theoretical variable 
with predictive or explanatory power: Brian Barry, Review Article: “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”, 4 BRIT. J. 
POLIT. SCI. 79 (1974); Michael Laver, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” Revisited: The Strategic Production and 
Consumption of Public and Private Goods, 6 BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 463 (1976). 
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to include law and legal strategies alongside more traditional political avenues like 
campaigning and lobbying. In the end, however, the idea of loyalty seemed to possess less 
traction in relation to litigation than it perhaps possessed in the original consumer quality 
context that Hirschman was studying. 
 
Regarding loyalty, it was hypothesised that loyalty to a locality or region may help to explain 
the puzzle of why small oil and gas companies and surface landowners have been involved in 
the majority of lawsuits against fracking bans and moratoriums. In the event, however, there 
was little evidence to support this in the case of oil and gas companies. And while there was 
some evidence of loyalty framing in the case of surface landowners, this was not particularly 
explicit. But more than that, insofar as loyalty connotes non-exit, it also implies a relatively 
straightforward ability to exit coupled with a conscious choice not to do so. With surface 
landowners, this requirement, necessary for loyalty to meaningfully apply, was typically 
absent: in many instances, exiting just was not a real option. Hirschman thus provides 
something of a mixed picture. On the one hand, for economic actors, exit is a potential 
strategic alterative to litigation. And it is instructive to conceive of litigation as a form of 
voice. But, on the other, loyalty has proved rather less useful as a concept here. 
 
While loyalty was unable to solve the puzzle of the preponderance of smaller company 
plaintiffs in fracking litigation, rational choice theory did seem to unlock the puzzle. Small 
and large companies may both be staring at losses running into many millions of dollars as a 
result of bans and moratoriums. Nevertheless, the benefits of litigating are less marked for 
large companies for whom those many millions will be more marginal in terms of their 
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overall operations; such companies must also balance these benefits against reputational costs 
that may arise from becoming involved in divisive litigation claims. 
